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The Efficiency of the Matching Process: 
Exploring the Impact of Regional Employment Offices in Croatia 
 
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the efficiency of the matching process in Croatian labour market by 
estimating matching function by panel stochastic frontier estimation on a regional level 
using Croatian Employment Service data over the 2000-2011 period. Results suggest that 
the efficiency is rising over time, with great variations across regions. In order to explore 
these variations, structural characteristics of the labour market together with some policy 
variables are included into the second-stage estimation. Among structural variables the 
proportion of agricultural and high-skilled workers have the most important positive effect 
on matching efficiency, while the local unemployment rate and the share of low-skilled and 
workers without any experience among job-seekers have the most important negative 
effect. As far as policy variables are concerned, both ALMPs and the number of high-skilled 
employees in regional employment offices positively affect matching efficiency. Additionally, 
when regional income per capita is included into the model it shows positive impact on 
matching efficiency, indicating that demand fluctuations also affect the matching process. 
In order to get consistent estimates, panel stochastic frontier model transformation is 
applied. Preliminary results show that there is no major difference in estimated mean 
technical efficiency coefficients in comparison to the original panel stochastic frontier 
model. 
 
Keywords: matching function, stochastic frontier, regional employment offices, efficiency, 
Croatia 
JEL classification: C33, J64, J69, P3 
 
 
Uèinkovitost procesa sparivanja: 
uloga podruènih ureda Hrvatskog zavoda za zapošljavanje 
 
Saetak: 
U radu se istrauje uèinkovitost procesa sparivanja na hrvatskom trištu rada putem ocjene 
funkcije sparivanja. Funkcija je ocijenjena metodom panel stohastièke granice na 
regionalnim podacima HZZ-a tijekom razdoblja 2000.-2011. Rezultati pokazuju kako 
uèinkovitost raste tijekom vremena, s velikim varijacijama meðu regijama. Kako bi se 
istraile te varijacije u drugoj fazi ocjene modela ukljuèene su strukturne karakteristike 
trišta rada zajedno s nekim varijablama koje bi trebale predstavljati mjere politike. Meðu 
strukturnim varijablama najvaniji pozitivan uèinak na uèinkovitost sparivanja ima udio 
poljoprivrednih i visoko kvalificiranih radnika, dok najveæi negativan utjecaj imaju regionalna 
stopa nezaposlenosti te udio nisko kvalificiranih radnika i onih bez iskustva na trištu rada. 
Što se tièe mjera politike – i aktivne politike na trištu rada kao i broj visoko kvalificiranih 
zaposlenika u podruènim uredima za zapošljavanje pozitivno utjeèu na uèinkovitost procesa 
sparivanja. Nadalje, kada se u model ukljuèi regionalni dohodak po stanovniku - on takoðer 
pokazuje pozitivan utjecaj na uèinkovitost sparivanja što govori da fluktuacije na strani 
potranje takoðer utjeèu na proces sparivanja. Kako bi dobili konzistentnu ocjenu modela, 
ocijenjen je i transformirani model panel stohastièke granice. Preliminarni rezultati pokazuju 
da ne postoji velika razlika u prosjeènom tehnièkom koeficijentu uèinkovitosti sparivanja u 
odnosu na izvorni panel model stohastièke granice. 
 
Kljuène rijeèi: funkcija sparivanja, stohastièka granica, podruèni uredi zavoda za 
zapošljavanje, uèinkovitost, Hrvatska 
JEL klasifikacija: C33, J64, J69, P3 
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1 Introduction1 
 
Even though it is often considered that labour market institutions reduce the size of the 
market by introducing a wedge between labour supply and labour demand they are still 
needed because of different inefficiencies, inequities and policy failures in modern labour 
markets (Boeri and van Ours, 2008). In order to respond to these market failures, 
intermediaries between workers and firms arise, usually in the form of state or private 
employment agencies, labour unions, craft guilds and similar. However, the precise 
economic function of these intermediaries is questionable (Autor, 2008). Nevertheless, 
the study of the situation in the labour market would not be complete if the labour 
market institutions were left out of the analysis.  
 
A traditional rationale for labour market institutions has been to facilitate the matching 
process in the labour market (Calmfors, 1994; Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). This is 
especially true in the case of transition countries that experienced huge changes in their 
labour markets after the breakdown of the former socialist system and shift towards 
market economy. Croatia belongs to this group of countries as well. Even though the 
shift in the (un)employment was less than expected in the early years of transition, high 
unemployment rates, combined with low employment and activity rates, persisted to 
date. The problem was only highlighted with the prolonged economic and financial crisis 
that started in the second half of 2008. Fahr and Sunde (2002) explain how reasons for 
high and persistent unemployment may lie on the labour supply side, with inadequate 
incentives for the unemployed to search for a job actively and inefficient labour market 
in terms of matching the unemployed job-seekers and vacant jobs, or on the labour 
demand side, with insufficient demand for labour as the main culprit for high 
unemployment. Kuddo (2009) as well as Brown and Koettl (2012), on the other hand, 
stress the importance of the capacity of relevant institutions. Hence, the right form of 
institutions (intermediaries) in the Croatian labour market is needed now more than 
ever.  
 
However, even in the case of Croatia, there are huge regional differences in the labour 
market. Some regions (counties) have pretty low unemployment, while others are 
struggling with high and increasing unemployment rates. That is why this paper 
examines the efficiency of the labour market on a regional level. The main objective of 
the paper is to estimate and explain the efficiency changes that may have taken place 
both over time and across regions. Additionally, the impact of regional employment 
offices on the matching efficiency is taken into account. Even though Croatian 
Employment Service is centralised in a way that financial structure and main policies are 
brought at the central level, the implementation of the policy is locally specific. Thus, the 
aim of the paper is to investigate the role played by employment offices in increasing 
                                                 
1 Earlier version of this paper was presented at the 18th Dubrovnik Economic Conference, Young Economist Seminar 
section. I am grateful to my discussants, Professor Laurence Ball and Professor Randall Filer, for their valuable 
comments. My gratitude also goes to Joanna Tyrowicz for her comments and ideas at a very early stage of this research. 
I would also like to thank Croatian Employment Service (CES), especially Ms Biserka Bulić, for granting me access to 
their data. 
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successful matching of vacancies and the unemployed in Croatia while controlling for 
different regional (both structural and policy) characteristics of the labour markets. In 
this respect, the stochastic frontier approach will be used since it allows for a more 
detailed analysis of the determinants of regional matching (in)efficiencies.  
 
The paper is organised into five sections. After a brief introduction, the second section 
presents a background for the topic in the form of a relevant literature review as well as a 
description of the main ‘intermediary’ in Croatian labour market – the Croatian 
Employment Service (CES). In addition to that, data used in subsequent empirical 
analysis are also described in this section. The third section presents methodology used 
for the empirical assessment of the matching efficiency on a regional level, while results 
of the conducted analysis are presented in the fourth section. Section five gives some 
concluding remarks.  
 
 
2 Background and Data Description 
 
2.1 Literature Review 
 
The literature on the persistence of regional unemployment in transition economies and 
the difference of regional unemployment from that in market economies is thoroughly 
examined by Ferragina and Pastore (2006). They explain how the process in transition 
countries was driven by massive and prolonged structural change, while the differences 
persisted over time for three main reasons: (i) restructuring is not yet finished; (ii) foreign 
capital was concentrated in successful regions for many years; and (iii) various forms of 
labour supply rigidity impeded the full process of adjustment (Ferragina and Pastore, 
2006). This topic was further elaborated in a number of works. The issue was mainly to 
establish efficiency of the local labour markets, predominantly by the use of the 
matching function. 
 
Ibourk et al. (2004) explain how the efficiency of the matching process determines the 
number of matches that will be observed at given input values. Additionally, Ibourk et al. 
(2004) and Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) explain how the efficiency can be considered a 
product of two factors: (i) the rate at which job-seekers and employers meet (search 
intensity) and (ii) the probability that a contact leads to a successful match. Destefanis 
and Fonseca (2007) explain similarly that the efficiency term is influenced by the search 
intensity of firms and workers, by the effectiveness of search channels, and by the labour 
mismatch across micro markets defined over areas, industries, or skills. They also argue 
how empirical measures of efficiency will reflect the evolution not only of the 
unemployment rate, but also of the separation rate and the rate of growth in the labour 
force (Destefanis and Fonseca, 2007). Munich and Svejnar (2009) state how the 
inefficiency may emerge by inadequate labour market institutions leading to decreasing 
search effort, skills depreciation, rising reservation wage of the unemployed, or 
geographical or skill mismatch. Given that the main issue in all these works is to estimate 
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efficiency and being that the matching function is usually interpreted as a production 
function – the stochastic production frontier approach is generally used. In this way, 
aggregate matching efficiency becomes a stochastic function of the variables accounting 
for the heterogeneity of job-seekers and firms (Ibourk et al., 2004). The authors also 
explain main advantages of this method in comparison to traditional fixed-effects model 
and conclude that “the stochastic frontier approach introduces powerful tools to measure 
the efficiency of production activities and analyse its determinants” (Ibourk et al., 2004: 
2). 
 
In their article, Ibourk et al. (2004) use stochastic (translog) production frontier model 
on data for 22 French regions in the 1990-1994 period and show that aggregate matching 
efficiency has decreased in the observed time period with wide cross-regional differences. 
Among explanatory variables, which explain about 30 percent of the variations of 
efficiency, in addition to long-term unemployment and population density, the most 
important ones are the share of the young, females and immigrants in the total stock of 
job-seekers. Fahr and Sunde (2002), on the other hand, show that inefficiencies in 
German labour market are determined by the composition of the labour market with 
respect to the age and education structure, as well as the current labour market 
conditions as indicated by labour market tightness. Disaggregation by region delivers a 
heterogeneous picture of the efficiency of the matching process but the authors consider 
the disaggregation across occupations to be more policy relevant than across different 
regions. Nevertheless, the same authors (Fahr and Sunde, 2006) further investigate 
regional dependencies in job creation by applying stochastic frontier analysis and show 
that search intensity or competition among firms, as indicated by labour market 
tightness, significantly increases matching efficiency as does search intensity and 
competition among job-seekers measured by the level of local unemployment. In 
addition, they present novel evidence on the complex interactions between spatial 
contingencies among regional labour markets since matching efficiency decreases with 
spatial autocorrelation in hiring, implying indirect evidence for crowding externalities 
(Fahr and Sunde, 2006). Destefanis and Fonseca (2007) use a matching theory approach 
with stochastic frontier estimation to assess the impact of the so-called 1997 Treu Act 
(which greatly fostered the development of temporary work in Italy) on the Italian labour 
market. They prove the existence of large efficiency differences between the South and the 
rest of the country where Treu Act had a positive impact on the matching efficiency in 
the North (mainly for skilled labour), and a negative impact on the matching efficiency 
of unskilled labour in the South. They interpret this finding in terms of a ladder effect, i.e. 
the need to focus on the skill mismatch in the Southern labour market both from the 
demand side and from the supply side (Destefanis and Fonseca, 2007). Furthermore, 
Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) try to determine the efficiency of the matching process on 
a regional level in Poland. They show that matching abilities are driven only by demand 
fluctuations while other variables, like unemployment structure across time and regions, 
coverage of active labour market programmes (ALMPs), and local labour office capacities, 
remain mostly insignificant. Additionally, Tyrowicz and Wójcik (2010) showed that the 
unemployment rates across regions in Poland were stable over the period between 1999 
 10 
and 2008, i.e. no convergence except the convergence of clubs for high unemployment 
regions. However, they demonstrated that whenever job prospects worsen throughout the 
country, the more deprived regions are hit harder. 
 
Hagen (2003) as well as Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007) argue that raising the efficiency of 
matching process is usually regarded as the main aim of ALMPs, and can be reached by 
adjusting human capital of job-seekers to the requirements of the labour market 
(important in transition economies) and by increasing search intensity (capacity) of the 
participants. Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007) estimate the impact of ALMPs on outflows 
from unemployment in Latvia and find positive and significant effect of training 
programmes on outflows from unemployment to employment indicating also that the 
hiring process is driven mainly by a stock of the unemployed at the beginning of the 
month and the flow of vacancies during the month.2 However, Brown and Koettl (2012) 
stress the fact that ALMPs improving labour market matching have an impact only in 
the short run. Still, they accentuate that these measures are highly cost-effective, though 
not during crises (Brown and Koettl, 2012).3  
 
Several additional works focus more on the active labour market policies and their 
impact on a regional level. For instance, Altavilla and Caroleo (2009), using data for 
Italy, show how active labour market policies settled at national level generate asymmetric 
effects when regions have different economic structures. Hujer et al. (2002) analyse 
macroeconomic effects of the ALMP using regional level data and find positive effects of 
vocational training and job creation schemes on the labour market situation for West 
Germany, whereas the results for East Germany do not allow for bold statements. 
Nevertheless, budget constraints are limiting the prospects of implementing active labour 
market measures with real impact which, together with enormous staff caseload in most 
of the regions, limits the scope of ALMP measures (Kuddo, 2009). Brown and Koettl 
(2012) also stress weak public institutions as barriers to raise the effectiveness of job 
matching in developing countries.  
 
The existing literature indicates regional labour market disparities in Croatia as well. 
Puljiz and Maleković (2007), for instance, by applying various inequality measures to 
regional and local units, such as coefficient of variations, Gini coefficient and Theil 
index, show how in the period 2000-2005 regional differences in unemployment rates 
increased, with the absence of any convergence. Botrić (2004) empirically tests the 
existing differences on a NUTS24 level in Croatia and shows substantial differences 
between Croatian regions regarding unemployment. Furthermore, using county-level 
(NUTS3) data from Labour Force Survey (LFS) in the period 2000-2005, she demonstrates 
quite visible differences in regional labour market indicators, implying the 
                                                 
2 The so-called stock-flow matching (Dmitrijeva and Hazans, 2007). 
3 They emphasize significant effects of intensified job-search assistance for unemployed on their employment 
probabilities and even earnings, especially for the long-term unemployed (Brown and Koettl, 2012). 
4 Proposed NUTS2 level at that time included five different regions: Northern Croatia, Central Croatia, Eastern 
Croatia, Western Croatia and Southern Croatia. 
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underdeveloped equilibrating mechanisms in the Croatian labour market (Botrić, 2007). 
Furthermore, Obadić (2004), using disaggregated (translog) matching function, confirms 
the existence of regional mismatch in some of the Croatian counties. In addition, Obadić 
(2006a; 2006b), when explaining the problem of structural unemployment for selected 
transition countries, finds that the biggest differences in the movement of regional 
mismatch among the observed countries are persistent in Croatia.  
 
 
2.2 Croatian Employment Service 
 
Figure 1 confirms the existence of regional disparities in Croatia by examining the shares 
of each region’s (county’s) employment and unemployment in total (national) 
employment and unemployment. Evidently, in some of the counties the share in 
national employment is much larger than the share in total unemployment (City of 
Zagreb or Istria county, for instance) while in others the share in total unemployment is 
much larger than the share in employment (Split-Dalmatia or Vukovar-Srijem county, for 
example). A similar occurrence is observable with regards to regional unemployment rates 
(Figure A1 in Appendix 2). One way to deal with these issues is via the actions of the 
Croatian Employment Service, especially its regional offices. 
 
Figure 1  Regional Shares in Total Employment and Unemployment 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on CBS and CES data. 
 
 
Typically, public employment services are responsible for all aspects of employment 
service provision – registering the unemployed, paying unemployment benefits to those 
who are entitled, giving advice, guidance and counselling to job-seekers, and delivery of 
active labour market programmes (Kuddo, 2009). Actually, one of the main aims of 
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public employment services should be to match the unemployed workers with open job 
positions as efficiently as possible. The Croatian Employment Service operates on these 
postulates as well. 
 
In its work the CES operates on two main levels:5 Central Office and Regional Offices. 
Central Office is responsible for the design and implementation of the national 
employment policy, i.e., it creates a unique methodology for professional and operational 
implementation of the procedures from the field of the CES activities. On the other 
hand, 22 Regional Offices6 perform professional and work activities from the CES 
priority functions, and provide support for them via monitoring and analysis of 
(un)employment trends in their counties. The main task of Regional Offices is to 
identify the needs of their county and implement their activities in line with those 
specificities. The Central Office provides guidelines for the work in the Regional Offices 
through its logistical support from all the aforementioned activities.  
 
CES functions as an off-budget beneficiary, which means that its financial operations are 
based on the funds from the state budget. Its activities are mainly financed from the 
contributions on the gross wage, but other sources are used as well. These other sources 
include revenues from the help from abroad to co-finance EU projects, as well as income 
support and donations from domestic entities to finance expenditures for job fairs. The 
largest share in total expenditures is represented by expenditures for rights during 
unemployment (approximately 70-80 percent of total expenditures in 2008-2010 period). 
As of 2006 the financing of active employment programmes is also included in total CES 
expenditures. These expenses comprise approximately 8 percent of total expenditures of 
the Service, while material and financial expenses are only 3 percent of total expenditure 
of the CES. Lately, an increasingly significant share of total expenditures is allocated to 
projects co-financed from the EU pre-accession programmes (http://www.hzz.hr).  
 
However, the effectiveness of employment offices varies by regions. For instance, some 
offices are much more effective than others in collecting information on job vacancies 
and in matching the unemployed with jobs. As stated in Kuddo (2009), in addition to 
(inadequate) funding, public policies to combat unemployment largely depend on the 
capacity of relevant institutions. The vacancy penetration ratio (Figure 2) approximates 
the capacity of regional employment office to collect information on job vacancies 
(World Bank, 2010). Such capacity is important because it determines the effectiveness of 
job intermediation services provided by employment offices. The vacancy penetration 
ratio less than one suggests that some of the unemployed have found jobs on their own 
while ratio higher than one means that some of the available vacancies cannot be filled in 
(possibly due to skills or regional mismatch). Figure 2 indicates that this ratio 
                                                 
5 Basic information about CES is obtained from their official web page: http://www.hzz.hr. 
6 One office in each county, with two offices in two counties: Sisak-Moslavina and Vukovar-Srijem, and Zagreb county 
and the City of Zagreb placed together in one regional office (see Table A2 in Appendix 1). Furthermore, within 
Regional Offices there are 96 Local Offices and the CES priority aims and functions are achieved by their presence and 
activities throughout the entire country (http://www.hzz.hr).  
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(effectiveness of regional employment offices) has decreased in the crisis. Still, an 
employment office can be effective in collecting vacancy information but less effective 
(or ineffective) in matching the unemployed with vacancies.  
 
Figure 2  Effectiveness of Regional Employment Offices (Vacancy Penetration Ratio) 
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Notes: Vacancy penetration ratio (V/M) - the ratio of the number of vacancies collected by the employment office to the 
total number of available job vacancies. The total number of vacancies is not known, but it can be approximated by the 
number of the unemployed who were placed to jobs (M) (World Bank, 2010). 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
 
On the other hand, high unemployment/vacancies ratio (Figure A2 in Appendix 2) has 
important policy implications too. Besides indicating that the problem probably lies in 
the demand deficiency, it also negatively affects the effectiveness of employment services, 
such as job search assistance and job brokerage (World Bank, 2010). Matching the high 
number of the unemployed with the low number of jobs is difficult and costly, while the 
effect is bound to be limited. Hence, the returns to job matching services are sharply 
diminishing when the unemployment/vacancies ratio goes up (as in the time of the 
crisis). Under such conditions the main policy challenge is to enhance job opportunities 
by supporting job creation (World Bank, 2010). Another indicator of regional 
employment office capacity is the ratio of the number of unemployed per one job 
counsellor (see Figure A3 in Appendix 2).7 There are high variations between regions in 
this indicator which points once again to different capacities of the employment offices. 
This is further confirmed by examining the outflow rate (M/U), i.e. hiring probability by 
regions (Figures A4 and A5 in Appendix 2). 
 
As was already mentioned, active labour market programmes, which are meant to help 
job-losers to find new jobs, besides poor financing (less than 10 percent of total 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, these data were not available prior to 2009. 
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expenditures), also have an extremely low coverage8 (Figure 3 and Figures A6 and A7 in 
Appendix 2) in Croatia. The total spending on labour market programmes, both passive 
and active, is very low by the European standards. For instance, in 2007 Croatia spent 
roughly 0.4 percent of its GDP on all labour market programmes, which is substantially 
less than what was spent by EU countries at a similar income level, such as Hungary, 
Poland or Slovakia (0.6 to 1.2 percent of GDP) (World Bank, 2010).  
 
Figure 3  ALMP Coverage Rate Across Regional Offices 
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Note: ALMP coverage rate – share of persons included in one of the active labour market programmes in total 
unemployment. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
 
In the years preceding the crisis, the coverage rate for active programmes was slightly over 
3 percent, and it fell to 2.5 percent in 2009 (Figure A6 in Appendix 2). However, recently, 
in an attempt to fight the impacts of the crisis on the labour market, the funds for the 
ALMPs somewhat increased, as well as the coverage rate for the unemployed (Figure 3 
and Figure A6). 
 
Nonetheless, the allocation of funds to regional employment offices, which in the end 
implement active labour market programmes, is mainly driven by the offices’ absorption 
capacity while local needs, measured by the unemployment share, seem to be only a 
secondary factor (World Bank, 2010).9 As it seems, regional allocation of ALMP funds is 
                                                 
8 The programme coverage rate is the percentage of the unemployed who participated in any active labour market 
programme.  
9 Unfortunately, due to data unavailability this observation could not be confirmed in the paper. 
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largely historically determined and changes little in response to changing local labour 
market conditions. Although this capacity based allocation rule ensures that programme 
funds are absorbed, it may come at a cost for regions where capacity is relatively low but 
needs are high (World Bank, 2010). Still, evidence from the literature shows that ALMPs 
are much more effective at addressing structural, rather than demand-deficient, 
unemployment (Kuddo, 2009).  
 
 
2.3 Data 
 
The data used for this research are regional data collected on a monthly basis within the 
NUTS3 (county) level obtained from the Croatian Employment Service over the period 
2000-2011. Instead of the county-level data, for the purpose of exploring the role of 
employment offices, CES regional office–level data are used (see the difference in Table 
A2 in Appendix 1). Main variables used in the analysis are: (1) the number of registered 
unemployed persons (U), (2) the number of reported vacancies (V), (3) the number of 
newly registered unemployed (U_new), and (4) the number of employed persons from 
the CES Registry (M). Besides these variables, the analysis also includes additional data 
that should affect the efficiency in the labour market. Detailed review and descriptive 
statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table A1 in Appendix 
1.10 
 
However, several important points concerning the data should be stressed here. First of 
all, some of the variables in the analysis are ‘stock’ variables (as reported at the end of the 
(previous (t-1)) month) while other variables are ‘flow’ variables (during a respective (t) 
month). It is interesting to notice how the reported vacancies are available only as a ‘flow’ 
variable, i.e., vacancies reported by each regional office are only those vacancies posted 
during the respective month. However, we do not consider this as a big obstacle, since it 
has been shown in a number of works (Coles and Petrongolo, 2002; Greg and 
Petrongolo, 2005; Dmitrijeva and Hazans, 2007; or Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009) that 
the dynamics between stocks of unemployed and flows of vacancies fits best the nature of 
the matching process. Nevertheless, the problem still exists since only a relatively small 
portion of vacancies are registered at public employment services (Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz, 2009; Kuddo, 2009). Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) argue how vacancies are 
systematically underreported and cannot serve for more than a proxy of the employers’ 
need, whereas the extent of underreporting may differ from region to region. In the 
Croatian case, as of 2002 the employers are no longer legally obliged to report vacancies 
to the CES, while all effects of the changes in legal obligations on reporting vacancies on 
the labour market were no longer visible as of 2004 (CNB, 2010).11 
 
                                                 
10 Additionally, these variables are explained more thoroughly in Section 4.2. 
11 This means that during some period after the legal obligation of posting vacancies at CES was abandoned there were 
visible effects in the labour market (including the matching process), but as of 2004 these effects vanished. Evidently, 
both the Croatian Employment Service and firms needed some time to adjust to a new situation. 
 16 
Additionally, in order to get an indicator of the quality of services of regional public 
employment offices, a number of inquiries has been sent to the Central Office 
concerning the number and quality (like education, position held, working tenure) of its 
staff on a regional level, as well as some other characteristics of each individual office 
(like the amount of financial resources allocated to each office, IT equipment and 
similar). Unfortunately, only educational structure of the CES staff on a regional level 
has been obtained. In addition to that, in order to evaluate the impact of ALMPs on the 
overall efficiency we tried to obtain the data concerning persons included in different 
programmes of active labour market policies (as well as the data on the amount of funds 
for each of the ALMP measures). However, data provided on a monthly basis included 
only the number of new participants included in different programmes of active labour 
market policies, while the data on the exact number of persons included in ALMPs were 
unavailable.12 Since these figures were too low (or inexistent) in the majority of the 
months for most of the counties (see Figure A7 in Appendix 2) this variable was not used 
in the empirical exercise. In the end, the data on the number of persons included in 
different programmes of active labour market policies on a yearly basis are provided and 
used in empirical analysis as a proxy for the policy variable determining the efficiency of 
the matching process.13  
 
Figure 4 shows the stocks of unemployment plus flows of unemployment and vacancies 
in a given period (2000m1-2011m12). Apart from the exceptionally large total number of 
unemployed, the figure shows that the number of newly registered unemployed is 
generally higher than the reported vacancies in the same month (also observable in 
Figure A2 in Appendix 2). This indicates that the problem in the Croatian labour market 
might be in the demand deficiency. 
 
On the other hand, vacancies (Figure 4) as well as vacancy ratios (Figure 5) demonstrate 
pretty high volatility over time. Average vacancy ratios (number of job offers per one job-
seeker) have ranged between 0.015 and 0.062, with the mean value of 0.036 offers per one 
job-seeker (having in mind that this contains only the number of job offers posted at 
CES offices). Naturally, this property of the data may lead to many estimation problems 
(Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). Among others, it seems that the time trend needs to be 
controlled for in a non-linear way, taking into account the up and down swings in the 
labour market outlooks. Figure 5 also demonstrates the (average) anti-cyclicality of 
vacancies over time, opposite to the pro-cyclicality dynamics of flows to employment in 
relation to a number of job offers at disposal in the labour offices. Actually, relatively 
high values observed at the right scale, imply that indeed public employment services  
 
                                                 
12 These data were available only after 2002. 
13 Since the reporting standards with job-seekers in activisation programmes and programmes themselves were defined 
differently across years, we use the sums of people covered by programmes in each regional labour office at each point 
in time (year), i.e., we consider ALMPs coverage at the end of the year. 
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dispose of only a fraction of unsubsidised vacancies available in the economy.14 In the 
periods of high labour demand (both cyclical and seasonal) considerably more of the 
unemployed find jobs than are at the disposal of local labour offices (Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz, 2009).  
 
Figure 4  Stocks of Unemployment Plus Flows of Unemployment and Vacancies - National 
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Notes: U – left scale; U_new and V – right scale. 
Source: CES. 
 
 
Figure 5  Vacancy Ratio and Flows From Unemployment to Employment (Over Vacancies) 
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Notes: V/U – left scale; M/V – right scale. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
                                                 
14 Kuddo (2009) explains how in most of the Eastern European and Central Asian countries a relatively small portion 
of vacancies are registered at public employment service (PES). He suggests that “in order to increase vacancy 
notifications, PES and job-seekers themselves should be more proactive in identifying job openings and breaking into 
the ‘hidden job market’, be it better marketing and services to employers from PES side to more active networking or 
direct employer contact from the job-seekers’ side” (Kuddo, 2009: 4). 
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3 Empirical Strategy 
 
The estimation methodology used in this paper has a foothold in the classical matching 
function:15 
 
),( VUfM = , (1)
 
where M is the number of jobs formed during a given time interval, U is the number of 
unemployed workers looking for work and V the number of vacant jobs.  
 
The matching function can be estimated using different methodological approaches.16 
The existing empirical literature, however, seldom goes beyond the basic matching 
function specification, despite the fact that the expanding literature has recently 
proposed a number of extensions, allowing for a large variety of externalities, market 
imperfections and particular forms of matching process (Dmitrijeva and Hazans, 2007). 
Most of the studies estimate a matching function in a Cobb-Douglas functional form, 
but there are some exceptions, of course.17 In addition, it is often argued how the 
aggregation of local labour market data might result in biased estimates of the matching 
function (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Therefore, an analysis is usually carried out 
on a regional or occupational level. In this paper, in order to capture regional disparities 
in both the matching process as well as in the work of local employment offices, the 
estimation is performed on a regional level.  
 
Two main techniques for evaluating matching efficiency on a regional 
(occupational/industrial) level that are usually used are stochastic frontier estimation and 
panel data regressions. However, while the fixed-effect model implies an unrealistic time-
invariance assumption of the matching efficiency and it is difficult to test for the 
potential influence of explanatory variables on matching (in)efficiencies, the use of 
stochastic frontier approach allows a more detailed analysis of the determinants of 
regional matching efficiencies (Ibourk et al., 2004). Thus, in order to explore the 
efficiency on a regional level, stochastic frontier approach will be used in this paper, as 
well as its modified version – transformed basic-form panel stochastic frontier model.  
 
 
                                                 
15 See for instance, Pissarides (2000) or Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001). 
16 For instance, Ibourk et al. (2004), Fahr and Sunde (2002; 2006), Destefanis and Fonseca (2007), or Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz (2009) use stochastic frontier estimation in order to determine the efficiency of a matching process. Yet, due to 
possible problems with endogeneity, and, consequently, inconsistent estimated coefficients, Munich and Svejnar (2009) 
and Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) suggest rather the use of the first-difference estimation. Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007), 
on the other hand, use OLS and GLS technique estimate, the so-called augmented matching function, which, among the 
possible determinants of job matches, includes policy variables. 
17 See, for instance, Ibourk et al. (2004). 
 19 
3.1 Stochastic Frontier Estimation 
 
Stochastic frontier estimation stems from the estimation of the production function. The 
basic idea behind the stochastic frontier model is in estimating the efficiency of the 
production process, where the main assumption is that each firm potentially produces 
less than it might, due to some degree of inefficiency,18 i.e.: 
 ( ) ititit xfy ξβ,= , (2)
 
where itξ  is the level of efficiency for firm i at time t; and itξ  must be in the interval (0; 
1]. If 1=itξ , the firm is achieving the optimal output with the technology embodied in 
the production function ( )β,itxf . When 1<itξ , the firm is not making the most of the 
inputs xit given the technology of the production function ( )β,itxf . Because the output 
is assumed to be strictly positive (yit>0), the degree of technical efficiency is assumed to 
be strictly positive as well, i.e., 0>itξ . 
 
However, output is also assumed to be subject to random shocks,19 meaning that: 
 ( ) )exp(, itititit xfy υξβ= , (3)
 
where )exp( itυ  represents a stochastic component that describes random shocks affecting 
the production process.  
 
In logarithmic form:  
 ( ){ } itititit xfy υξβ ++= )ln(,ln)ln( . (4) 
 
Assuming that there are k inputs and that the production function is linear in logs, 
defining )ln( ititu ξ−=  yields: 
 
itit
k
j
jitjit uxy −++= ∑
=
υββ
1
0 )ln()ln( . (5)
 
Because itu  is subtracted from )ln( ity , restricting 0≥itu  implies that 10 ≤< itξ , as 
specified above.  
 
                                                 
18 First proposed in the works by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Battese 
and Coelli (1993: 1) nicely explain how the stochastic frontier production function postulates the existence of technical 
inefficiencies of production of firms involved in producing a particular output: “For a given combination of input 
levels, it is assumed that the realized production of a firm is bounded above by the sum of a parametric function of 
known inputs, involving unknown parameters, and a random error, associated with measurement error of the level of 
production or other factors, such as the effects of weather, strikes, damaged product, etc. The greater the amount by 
which the realized production falls short of this stochastic frontier production, the greater the level of technical 
inefficiency.”  
19 These shocks are not directly attributable to the producer or the underlying technology. They may come as a 
consequence of uncontrollable phenomena like weather changes, economic adversities and similar. Even though each 
producer is facing a different shock, the assumption is that the shocks are random and they are described by a common 
distribution. 
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Additionally, in Equation (5) itυ  represents the idiosyncratic error ( 2~N(0,it υυ σ )), while 
much of the literature has been devoted to deriving estimators for different specifications 
of the random inefficiency term that constitutes the only panel-specific effect, itu .  
 
For example, Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) assume that itu  has half standard 
normal distribution. However, this assumption presumes that (in)efficiency is time-
invariant. Batesse and Coelli (1995), on the other hand, assume that non-negative 
technical inefficiency effects are a function of time and firm-specific variables and that 
they are independently distributed as truncations of normal distributions with constant 
variance, but with means which are a linear function of observable variables, i.e.: 
 
ititit zu ωδ += , (6)
 
where itω  is defined by the non-negative truncation of the normal distribution with zero 
mean and variance 2ωσ , such that the point of truncation is δitz− , i.e., δω itit z−≥ . 
Consequently, uit is a non-negative truncation of the normal distribution with N(zitδ, 
2
uσ ). 
 
Fahr and Sunde (2002) further explain how uit can vary over time, i.e.  
 
i
Tt
it uu i
)(exp −−= η , (7)
 
where Ti is the last period in the ith panel, η is an unknown (decay) parameter to be 
estimated, and the ui’s are assumed to be iid non-negative truncations of the normal 
distribution with mean μ  and variance 2uσ : ),(N~ 2uu σμ+ . The non-negative effects ui 
decrease, remain constant, or increase over time, if η>0, η=0 or η<0, respectively. ui and 
vit are distributed independently of each other and the covariates in the model.  
 
The method of maximum likelihood is proposed for simultaneous estimation of the 
parameters of the stochastic frontier and the model for the technical inefficiency effects, 
while the likelihood function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters (Batesse 
and Coelli, 1995). Total variance of the process of matching which is not explained by 
the exogenous shocks is denoted as 2sσ  ( 222 uS σσσ υ += ) and the share of this total 
variance accounted for by the variance of the inefficiency effect is γ ( 22 / Su σσγ ≡ ), where 
γ actually measures the importance of inefficiency for a given model specification (Fahr 
and Sunde, 2002).  
 
Thus, the technical efficiency of the matching process is based on its conditional 
expectation, given the model assumptions: 
 
)exp()exp( itititit zuTE ωδ −−=−= . (8)
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3.2 Applying Stochastic Frontier Estimation to the Matching Function 
 
The same approach as the one described above can be applied to labour market, i.e., to 
the process of matching between workers who seek for a job and firms that look for 
workers. In this case the output is the number of matches/hires while inputs are the 
number of unemployed workers looking for work and the number of vacant jobs 
(Equation (1)). The application of this type of estimation to the labour market was first 
introduced by Warren (1991) while recently the model has been applied in a number of 
works estimating the efficiency of the matching process on specific labour markets: 
Ibourk et al. (2004) for France, Fahr and Sunde (2002; 2006) for Germany, Destefanis and 
Fonseca (2007) for Italy, and Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) for Poland. 
 
For instance, Ibourk et al. (2004) explain how the matching process can be compared to 
the production process, where (in)efficiency of the matching process ( itξ ) corresponds to 
total factor productivity, i.e., it determines the number of matches that will be observed 
at given input values. On the other hand, Fahr and Sunde (2002) differentiate between 
productivity and efficiency in the matching function,20 and say that in labour markets 
exhibiting high levels of matching efficiency, but low productivity, the objective for the 
policy-maker should be to increase the productivity. 
 
The model in this paper is mostly based on Ibourk et al. (2004)21 and Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz (2009) where the total number of matches is a function of the total number of 
job vacancies and job-seekers, plus a set of variables representing the share of each group j 
in total unemployment. Namely, it is explained how policy relevant variables can be 
introduced into the model if the assumption about the homogeneity of the unemployed 
is relaxed by varying the individual search intensities.22 Thus, we use a non-stochastic 
model where different groups of job-seekers can have different search intensities: 
 
21 ))1(( 11
ββ ∑ −− += j jitjititit UcVEM , (9)
 
                                                 
20 They explain the productivity in terms of the stocks of job-seekers and vacant positions in relation to creating new 
employment. For example, if the elasticity of new matches with respect to these determinants is high in a certain 
region, these stocks exhibit a high matching productivity. However, if at the same time inefficiencies are high, an 
increase in the stocks would lead to fewer new matches than is technically feasible. In such an environment, policies 
that aim at reducing the inefficiencies would be advisable. On the other hand, finding high efficiency estimates given 
the stocks of unemployed and vacancies as inputs indicates that creating a vacancy or increasing the available labour 
force in the respective region would lead to additional job creation with high probability (Fahr and Sunde, 2002: 3). 
21 Even though in the first version of the paper Ibourk et al. (2001) used the Cobb-Douglas function specification, in 
the version from 2004 they used the translog production frontier model explaining how by using a restrictive 
functional form like Cobb-Douglas one may bias the estimate of the return to scale parameter (Ibourk et al., 2004). 
However, we stick to the Cobb-Douglas functional form because it is predominant in the empirical literature. 
22 Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007) also suggest that policy relevant variables can be introduced into the model if the 
assumption about the homogeneity of unemployed is relaxed by varying the individual search intensities. They do that 
by assuming that the unemployed who have completed some kind of training programme have higher search intensities 
than their non-trained peers, ceteris paribus. However, they neglect problems of adverse selection and reverse causality, 
and by taking the share of the trained directly in the stochastic frontier estimation (instead of two stage approach) they 
risk endogeneity consequences (Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). 
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where jc  represents deviations from the average search intensity, so that negative values 
are characteristic for less than the average search effort. If all groups had identical search 
intensity, then jc  would be equal to 0 for each j and we would be back to the standard 
model without the heterogeneity. 
 
Rearranging Equation (9), one obtains: 
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Taking logs of Equation (10) and assuming the term in between brackets is close to 1, we 
get: 
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β β δ −− −
−
≈ + + +∑ , (11) 
 
where small letters indicate the log of the variables and jj c2βδ = . A similar 
development could be made with respect to job vacancies.  
 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), the assumption is that the effects of heterogeneity 
that affect search intensity have direct impact on the matching efficiency (and not on the 
matching process itself), i.e., that they are included in term itz  in the following equation: 
 [ ] [ ]itititititit zuvm ωδυββα +++++= −121 , (12) 
 
where itω  is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero mean and 
variance 2ωσ .  
 
Additionally, this model may be augmented to distinguish between the stocks and the 
flows (of both vacancies and unemployed), as advocated by Coles and Petrongolo (2002), 
Greg and Petrongolo (2005), Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007) as well as Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz (2009). 
 
Efficiency coefficient is obtained by computing conditional estimates (as in Equation 
(8)): 
 
ˆ ˆˆ | , , ,it itZite E e M V U Z
δ ω+⎡ ⎤= ⎣ ⎦ . (13)
 
Furthermore, Ibourk et al. (2004) also emphasize how the unemployed workers who enter 
special training programmes (ALMPs) are not included in the unemployment variable, 
1−itu , which could further decrease matching efficiency in the labour market, i.e., if the 
special employment programmes are in effect targeted on workers with lower 
employment prospects, removing them from the market will increase the observed 
matching efficiency:  
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where 1
j
tS −  represents the number of unemployed workers of group j who enter a special 
training programme and are withdrawn from the official unemployment statistics and 
φβϕ 2= where ( )1 1/j jt tj S S cφ − −≡ −∑ , i.e., the weighted search intensity of unemployed 
withdrawn from the market and entering special training programmes. 
 
Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) emphasize that although by construction ALMPs and 
other variables should not be simultaneously correlated, endogeneity might occur in the 
form of the statistical phenomenon and thus they follow the approach commenced by 
Ibourk et al. (2004), incorporating the ALMPs effects to determine the technical 
efficiency scores, but not the matching process itself.23 Therefore, in this paper the used 
model assumes that different groups of job-seekers may exhibit different search 
intensities, either due to the individual characteristics (e.g., age, education) or because of 
ALMPs. 
 
Possible shortcoming of the estimation of the efficiency of the matching function comes 
from the fact that the data from Croatian Employment Service do not observe job-to-job 
flows.24 However, this is a frequent problem in this type of research. Consequently, the 
estimation of the matching efficiency of a particular office (as opposed to whole regional 
labour markets) rests upon the vacancies that are filled exclusively from the category of 
the unemployed.  
 
 
3.3 Model Transformation 
 
Munich and Svejnar (2009) argue that the explanatory variables in the matching function 
(unemployment and vacancies) are predetermined by previous matching processes 
through the flow identities. Thus, in order to obtain consistent estimates, they suggest 
that one needs to apply the first difference approach to the estimation of the matching 
function, i.e.: 
 
1 1 2 1it it it itm u vβ β ε− −Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ . (15)
 
In addition, they also suggest that further lags of tuΔ will be uncorrelated with tεΔ  
which they use as an argument in favour of the instrumental variables as a method of 
estimation (Munich and Svejnar, 2009). However, Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) argue 
                                                 
23 Dmitrijeva and Hazans (2007) explain how using expenditure on ALMPs or the number of current participants in 
ALMPs in the model leads to the problem of endogeneity because, if, for instance, the situation in the labour market 
worsens the expenditures may rise, which may lead to selection bias. However, they argue that when units are regions 
and not individuals the selection issue is less of a problem. 
24 Additionally, due to data limitation, the interregional migration is also neglected. 
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that this approach does not allow capturing the relation between local conditions and the 
matching performance which is the main aim of this research.  
 
Some of these issues, primarily those concerning stochastic frontier estimation, are 
further explored in works by Greene (2005a; 2005b) and Wang and Ho (2010). Greene 
(2005a) argues that the traditional panel stochastic frontier estimation approach has two 
main shortcomings: (i) it usually assumes that (technical) inefficiency is time invariant 
and (ii) it forces any time invariant cross unit heterogeneity into one term that is being 
used to capture the inefficiency, i.e., it does not distinguish between unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and inefficiency. Even though the first limitation is generally 
solved by Batesse and Coelli (1995), the second problem remains in most of the empirical 
works. For instance, Wang and Ho (2010) explain how even in the cases where time-
invariant inefficiency assumption has been relaxed, the time-varying pattern of 
inefficiency is the same for all individuals. Greene (2005a; 2005b) proposes some 
extension of both fixed and random effects estimator of the stochastic frontier models 
that should deal with these issues.  
 
Wang and Ho (2010), on the other hand, argue that Greene’s (2005a; 2005b) ‘true fixed-
effect stochastic frontier model’ may be biased by the problem of incidental (fixed-effect) 
parameters.25 Even though Greene (2005a; 2005b) showed that the incidental parameters 
problem does not cause bias to the slope coefficients, the estimation problem arises in 
the error variance estimation, upon which the inefficiency of the stochastic frontier is 
actually based on. Hence, Wang and Ho (2010) present a solution to the problem in a 
form of first-difference and within transformation that can be analytically performed on 
the model to remove the fixed individual effects, and thus the estimator becomes 
immune to the incidental parameters problem. Namely, they remove the fixed individual 
effects prior to the estimation by simple transformations, thus taking into account both 
time-varying inefficiency and time-invariant individual effects. Their initial model 
resembles the one in Equation (5), i.e.: 
 
ititiit xy εβα ++= , (16)
 
where iα  is individual i’s fixed unobservable effect; ititit u−=υε ; )N(0,~ 2υσυit ; 
*
iitit uhu ⋅= ; )( δitit zfh = ; and ),(N~ 2* uiu σμ+ . Neither xit nor zit contains constants 
(intercepts) because they are not identified and ui* is independent of all T observations 
on vit. Both ui* and vit are independent of all T observations on (xit; zit).26 
 
Fixed individual effect iα  can be removed from the model by first-differencing it: 
 
                                                 
25 Possible inconsistency due to the number of parameters growing with the number of firms. 
26 The model exhibits the so-called “scaling property” that is, conditional on zit, the one-sided error term equals a 
scaling function hit multiplied by a one-sided error distributed independently of zit. With this property, the shape of the 
underlying distribution of inefficiency is the same for all individuals, but the scale of the distribution is stretched or 
shrunk by observation-specific factors zit. The time-invariant specification of ui* allows the inefficiency uit to be 
correlated over time for a given individual (Wang and Ho, 2010). 
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ititit xy εβ Δ+Δ=Δ , (17)
 
where ititit uΔ−Δ=Δ υε ; )MN(0,~ ΣΔ itυ ; *iitit uhu ⋅Δ=Δ ; and ),(N~ 2* uiu σμ+ . The 
truncated normal distribution of ui* is not affected by the transformation. This key 
aspect of the model leads to a tractable likelihood function.27  
 
In order to compute technical efficiency index, the conditional expectation estimator is 
used, i.e., conditional expectation of uit on the vector of a differenced itε . The advantages 
of using this estimator are: (i) the vector iε~Δ  ( ),...,,(~ 32 iTiii εεεε ΔΔΔ=Δ ) contains all 
the information of individual i in the sample, and (ii) the estimator depends on βˆ  (for 
which the variance is of order 1/((N-1)/T)) but not iαˆ  (for which the variance order is 
1/T). The derivation of the equation looks like the following: 
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which is evaluated at ii εε ~ˆ~ Δ=Δ  and where 21'
1'2
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−
; 
21'
2
* /1~~
1
uii hh σ
σ +ΔΣΔ= − ; βε iii xy
~~~ Δ−Δ=Δ ; and Φ  is the cumulative density function 
of a standard normal distribution.28 
 
Although the individual effects αi's are not estimated in the model, their values can be 
recovered after the model's other parameters are estimated by the transformed model 
proposed above. A T-consistent estimator of αi may be obtained by solving the first-order 
condition for αi from the untransformed log-likelihood function of the model, assuming 
all other parameters are known. Hence, in order to get more consistent estimates we will 
use Wang and Ho’s (2010) model transformation of the stochastic frontier estimation of 
the matching function.29 
 
 
                                                 
27 For details, please see Wang and Ho (2010). 
28 Wang and Ho (2010) show that the within-transformed and first-differenced models are algebraically the same (by 
within-transformation, the sample mean of each panel is subtracted from every observation in the panel). 
29 Even though the two-stage estimation procedure is justified on the grounds of problems with endogeneity (Jeruzalski 
and Tyrowicz, 2009), Batesse and Coelli (1995), Wang and Schmidt (2002) as well as Ibourk et al. (2004) argue in favour 
of the one-stage instead of the two-stage stochastic frontier estimation. Ibourk et al. (2004) state how the two-stage 
procedure used to this end typically implies the loss of a large amount of information and degrees of freedom. 
Furthermore, Battese and Coelli (1995) explain how even if a second stage regression can be performed, it is in 
contradiction with the identically distributed inefficiency assumption (first stage).  
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4 Estimation Results 
 
In this section, the estimation results are presented. First, the results from the first stage 
of stochastic frontier model (Equation (12)) are shown and subsequently the results from 
the second stage are given, i.e., the estimation of the panel regression for the estimated 
technical efficiency coefficients (Equation (13)) from the first step. In the third section, 
the results from the estimation of the basic-form transformed panel stochastic frontier 
model are provided. 
 
 
4.1 Stochastic Frontier Estimation 
 
For the estimation of a stochastic frontier we have used the time-varying decay model 
(Battese and Coelli, 1995).30 Additionally, in order to control for the sizeable seasonality 
typically contained in these variables (see Figure 5) it is desirable to include month and 
year specific dummy variables as regressors in the model. Therefore, estimations include 
monthly dummies to control for the differentiated vacancies and job-seekers arrival rates 
throughout each year, and year dummies for the period when the reporting of vacancies 
at CES was still in effect, i.e., for the years 2000-2003. In addition, in the existing 
empirical work, variables are usually normalized (by the size of the labour force) in order 
to control for heteroscedasticity (Dur, 1999; Munich and Svejnar, 2009). However, since 
the size of the labour force in Croatia varied substantially during the observed period 
and being that the data about labour force on a regional level are not available,31 in this 
paper we do not normalize the data by the size of the workforce because it could 
negatively affect the statistical properties of the model. Still, the analysis is conducted 
(and presented) on the whole sample, as well as on the sample excluding the biggest 
region (which belongs to Zagreb regional office).32 Besides, in the analysis estimating the 
determinants of matching efficiency – the variable indicating population density is 
included in order to control for the ‘size’ of the respective labour market. Finally, as 
explained previously, the estimations include both stocks and flows of unemployed and 
only flows of vacancies. 
 
Results from the stochastic frontier estimation are reported in Table 1 (for the 
unrestricted estimation) and Table 2 (for the restricted estimation indicating constant 
returns to scale). Since the variables are in logarithms, the estimations actually represent 
elasticities. 
                                                 
30 This means that the inefficiency term is modelled as a truncated-normal random variable multiplied by a specific 
function of time; the idiosyncratic error term is assumed to have normal distribution, while the random inefficiency 
term constitutes the only panel-specific effect. 
31 For instance, until 2002, data on the persons employed in entities with less than ten employees were not included in 
total employment data at county level, while up to 2004, data on the persons employed in the police and military were 
not included in total employment data at county level. What’s more, data on the size of the labour force on a regional 
level are published only once a year, indicating the situation on 31 March (see Figure A1 in Appendix 2). 
32 As argued in Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009), larger labour markets are usually characterised by larger flows, including 
outflows to employment without any support from the public employment services. 
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Table 1  Stochastic Frontier Unrestricted Estimation 
 Total sample Zagreb region excluded 
Variables Stocks of u Flows of u Both Sum Stocks of u Flows of u Both Sum 
0.761***  0.911***  0.773***  0.924***  
u 
(0.023)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.029)  
0.241*** 0.262*** 0.233*** 0.248*** 0.242*** 0.260*** 0.235*** 0.250*** 
v 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) 
 0.026 -0.166***   0.019 -0.155***  
u_new 
 (0.021) (0.019)   (0.021) (0.019)  
   0.741***    0.765*** 
u_sum 
   (0.020)    (0.021) 
Monthly 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Annual 
dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Returns to 
scale CRS DRS CRS CRS CRS DRS CRS CRS 
-2.598*** 4.952*** -2.713*** -2.564*** -2.721*** 7.245 -2.923*** -2.817*** 
Constant 
(0.191) (0.217) (0.192) (0.171) (0.180) (6.556) (0.209) (0.187) 
0.762 0.384 0.691 0.805 0.762 0.038 0.692 0.805 Mean technical 
efficiency (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wald 2χ  7470.74*** 4625.79*** 7548.41*** 7779.14*** 7685.43*** 4693.50*** 7395.96*** 7563.52*** 
0.104 0.762 0.150 0.075 0.086 0.716 0.155 0.077 γ  
(0.038) (0.065) (0.045) (0.030) (0.032) (0.065) (0.049) (0.033) 
0.005*** 0.0004*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.0001 0.005*** 0.007*** η  
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log likelihood  76.710 -263.551 114.912 42.030 89.924 -230.525 127.090 60.848 
No. of 
observations 3168 3168 3168 3168 3024 3024 3024 3024 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: log of monthly flows to employment out of unemployment (m). γ represents the share of total 
variance accounted for by the variance of the inefficiency effect ( 22 / Su σσγ ≡ ) while η comes from the time-varying decay 
model ( i
Tt
it uu i
)(exp −−= η ), where the non-negative effects ui decrease, remain constant, or increase over time, if η>0, η=0 
or η<0, respectively. Monthly and annual dummies are statistically significant, detailed results available upon request. 
Variables are in logarithms, lagged when necessary. Standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
As is evident from Table 1, there is a larger weight of job-seekers in the matching process 
than is that of the posted vacancies. This result is not unusual, since in most of the 
empirical work the number of unemployed tends to affect hiring more than the number 
of posted vacancies (for instance, Ibourk et al., 2004; Fahr and Sunde, 2006; Jeruzalski 
and Tyrowicz, 2009).33 What is more, only the stock of the unemployed positively affects 
the process of matching, while the newly registered unemployed decrease the matching 
capacity. This is in congruence with some other empirical results (Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz, 2009). Nonetheless, in this case adding the flow variable in the model actually 
increases the impact of the stock variable. Additionally, in the case of summing the two 
variables for the unemployed, the coefficient for the number of vacancies slightly 
increases while the result for the total number of unemployed (u + u_new) is as expected. 
                                                 
33 Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) indicate how the regression that omits on-the-job search will give too low an 
estimate of the effect of vacancies on matchings (too high of unemployment). 
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As discussed earlier, the size of the region could have an impact on the matching process. 
That is why we present the estimates using the sample without the biggest region – 
Zagreb. However, by excluding the largest region, we do not get results much different 
from the ones with the data from the entire sample. That is why we will use the estimates 
of technical efficiency coefficients from the estimation for the whole sample in the rest 
of the paper. 
 
Furthermore, in order to test for the (in)existence of the constant returns to scale in the 
model, the Wald test of coefficient restrictions was conducted, where null hypothesis is 
equal to 1=+ vu ββ ; 1_ =++ newuvu βββ ; or 1_ =+ vsumu ββ . The results are provided 
in Table 1 on the basis of the test statistics. Specifications with only stocks of the 
unemployed and with both stocks and flows in Table 1 indicate that the model exhibits 
constant returns to scale. 
 
Therefore, in Table 2 the results from the restricted estimation (where 1=+ vu ββ ; 
1_ =++ newuvu βββ ; and 1_ =+ vsumu ββ ) are presented. As expected, there is no 
significant difference between these estimations and those presented in Table 1, including 
both total sample as well as the sample without the Zagreb regional office data.  
 
Table 2  Stochastic Frontier Restricted Estimation 
 Total sample Zagreb region excluded 
Variables Stocks of u Both Sum Stocks of u Both Sum 
0.759*** 0.928***  0.760*** 0.921***  
u 
(0.010) (0.022)  (0.010) (0.022)  
0.241*** 0.235*** 0.249*** 0.240*** 0.235*** 0.249*** 
v 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
 -0.163***   -0.155***  
u_new 
 (0.019)   (0.019)  
  0.751***   0.751*** 
u_sum 
  (0.010)   (0.010) 
Monthly dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Annual dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
-2.577*** -2.890*** -2.664*** -2.600*** -2.888*** -2.680*** 
Constant 
(0.037) (0.054) (0.037) (0.037) (0.054) (0.037) 
0.763 0.685 0.801 0.765 0.693 0.807 Mean technical 
efficiency (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wald 2χ  9057.41*** 9259.30*** 9024.01*** 9001.19*** 5767.96*** 8935.95*** 
0.102 0.158 0.080 0.083 0.154 0.073 γ  
(0.036) (0.047) (0.031) (0.031) (0.048) (0.030) 
0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.007*** η  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log likelihood  76.704 114.464 41.855 89.682 127.075 60.562 
No. of observations 3168 3168 3168 3024 3024 3024 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: log of monthly flows to employment out of unemployment (m). γ represents the share of total 
variance accounted for by the variance of the inefficiency effect ( 22 / Su σσγ ≡ ) while η comes from the time-varying decay 
model ( i
Tt
it uu i
)(exp −−= η ), where the non-negative effects ui decrease, remain constant, or increase over time, if η>0, η=0 
or η<0, respectively. Monthly and annual dummies are statistically significant, detailed results available upon request. 
Variables are in logarithms, lagged when necessary. Standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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However, the main aim of this estimation was to establish the degree of (in)efficiency of 
the matching process. Interestingly, adding the newly registered unemployed to the 
model specification diminishes matching efficiency. Mean values from Table 1 suggest 
that the matching (hiring) process is on average 25-30 percent inefficient given the inputs 
(the unemployed and vacancies). Nevertheless, there are great variations across 
regions/regional offices (Figure 6).34 For instance, regional office Pula exhibits almost 100 
percent efficiency,35 while regional office Sisak is approximately 50 percent efficient in 
matching unemployed workers with available jobs. This variability of estimated technical 
efficiency coefficients across regions guarantees sufficient variation to perform the second 
stage analysis (Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009).  
 
Figure 6  Mean Technical Efficiency Across Regional Offices (With and Without Zagreb 
Region) 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
 
Nevertheless, all regional offices show a rise in the matching efficiency in the period 
2000-2011 (Figure 7 and Figure A10 in Appendix 3).36 Even though this result goes hand-
                                                 
34 In both Figure 6 and Figure 7 efficiency estimates from the (restricted) specification with both stocks and flows of 
the unemployed (column 2 in Table 2) are presented. 
35 This result looks a bit unusual, but it only indicates that in Istria (covered by the Pula regional office) almost all 
available vacancies are filled from the category of registered unemployed in a respective month. This result also points 
to a highly dynamic labour market in the county of Istria. This is also confirmed by the low unemployment rates (see 
Figure 1 and Figure A1 in Appendix 2) in this county. 
36 On top of that, if we exclude Zagreb region, the efficiency coefficient estimates stay almost the same. 
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in-hand with some other empirical results (for instance, Šergo, Poropat and Gržinić, 
2009) this outcome is somewhat puzzling. Fahr and Sunde (2002), for instance, explain 
that increasing efficiency over time may be interpreted as the agents in the market 
learning how to find appropriate partners in order to form matches. Šergo, Poropat and 
Gržinić (2009) clarify their finding in a similar way, explaining how rising efficiency in 
Croatian labour market since the war and the de-industrialization shocks in the ‘90s is 
connected with the capitalist framework of private employers. Namely, they describe how 
the responsiveness of the labour market depends not only on the willingness of the 
unemployed to fill jobs but also on the responsiveness of employers to fill vacancies with 
workers. Since our model refers to a somewhat later period (2000-2011), this can only 
serve as partial explanation. However, one has to remember that as of 2002 only a 
fraction of vacancies is posted at the CES while the number of the unemployed was 
constantly declining up to 2009 (start of the recession), which also had influence on the 
increasing matching efficiency. Other factors will be explained in the following section. 
 
Figure 7  Mean Technical Efficiency Over the Years (With and Without Zagreb Region) 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
 
4.2 Covariates of Technical Efficiency 
 
Following Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009), in this section we present the estimation 
results for the covariates of technical efficiency scores.37 In this way, the characteristics of 
a local labour market are approached by the means of proxies. Namely, some local 
                                                 
37 Although the regression construct specifies causality direction from the right-hand-side variables to the left-hand-side 
one - we are only trying to establish if there is a link between some control factors and the individual efficiency scores 
(Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). In addition, it can be argued that both the unemployment and the vacancies affect the 
value of (in)efficiency, and that variables that serve as determinants of the (in)efficiency may directly affect the 
matching process. However, following the standard procedure from the literature (Warren, 1991; Batesse and Coelli, 
1995; Fahr and Sunde, 2002; 2006; Ibourk et al., 2004; Destefanis and Fonseca, 2007 or Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009) 
it is assumed that the variables that affect matching (in)efficiency do not directly impact the matching process. Possible 
endogeneity of vacancies and unemployment will be discussed later on in the paper. 
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markets may be more dynamic than others, while some may be populated by the more 
difficult groups of the unemployed. To account for this differentiation, following Ibourk 
et al. (2004), Destefanis and Fonseca (2007) and Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009), we have 
used the following measures: 
 
• Labour market structure (Figure A9 in Appendix 2): 
- vacancy ratio (v/u): measure of labour market tightness 
- regional unemployment rate (reg_unrate) 
- ratio of employed to delisted (m/delisted) 
- share of females in total unemployment (u_female) and in total flows to 
employment (m_female) 
- share of the young (u_<24y) in the pool of the unemployed 
- share of the long-term unemployed in the pool of the unemployed (u_12m+) 
- share of workers without experience in the pool of the unemployed (u_w/o 
experience) 
- share of workers previously employed in the primary sector of economic activity 
in the pool of the unemployed (u_primary_sector) 
- share of unemployed persons receiving unemployment benefits in the pool of 
the unemployed (u_benefits) 
- share of the no or low-skilled unemployed among the jobless (u_low skilled) 
- share of the high-skilled unemployed among the jobless (u_high skilled) 
• ALMPs coverage rate (u_almp_coverage) 
• Number of the highly skilled employed at the respective CES regional office per one 
unemployed (CES_high skilled) 
• Net income per capita in a specific region/county (net income_pc) 
• Size of the labour market measured by the population density (pop_density) 
 
In addition, linear and quadratic trends are included to control for the country-wide 
labour market fluctuations, while monthly and annual dummies are introduced in order 
to control for large seasonal fluctuations. 
 
Different variables included in ‘labour market structure’ may reflect different search 
intensities, willingness to accept received job offers and/or firms’ attitudes (Ibourk et al., 
2004). For instance, labour market tightness represents the search intensity of firms and 
competition among firms for applicants (Fahr and Sunde, 2006), but it can also be a good 
measure of the cycle (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Level of local unemployment 
(regional unemployment rate), on the other hand, can be a good measure of the search 
intensity and competition among job-seekers. The share of females in both unemployment 
and in total flows to employment, corresponds to the diversity of job creation and 
destruction in particular labour markets; youth usually demonstrates higher adaptability 
(search intensity), while the low-skilled unemployed typically represent lower value to the 
employers, which may constitute an obstacle in smooth unemployment-to-employment 
transitions (Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). Additionally, share of the long-term 
unemployed may capture both business cycle effects and more structural difficulties (such 
as skills mismatch) (Ibourk et al., 2004) while share of the unemployed receiving 
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unemployment benefits should affect the willingness to accept the job (via reservation 
wage). Furthermore, share of females in total unemployment as well as the share of long-
term unemployed may indicate ranking effects while the share of unemployed in 
agriculture (primary sector) may indicate some firm effects (Destefanis and Fonseca, 2007). 
 
As discussed earlier, ALMPs coverage rate (u_almp_coverage) is constructed as the 
number of individuals in any treatment over the pool of the unemployed in a respective 
region at the year end. This variable is important because it should affect different search 
intensities and thus influence the matching efficiency. Moreover, the number of the 
highly skilled employed at the respective CES regional office per one unemployed 
(CES_high skilled) should serve as a proxy of regional labour office capacity. Even 
though the number of job counsellors or even job brokers (Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 
2009) would be a better measure, due to unavailability of the data (see Figure A3 in 
Appendix 2), the number of highly skilled CES employees per one unemployed will serve 
this purpose. In order to somehow control for the demand fluctuations, net income per 
capita on a regional level is used here. Some other variables, like investments or 
consumption, could probably serve a better purpose in this respect, but due to data 
unavailability on a region/county level we stick to net income per capita.38  
 
As argued by Ibourk et al. (2004) as well as Munich and Svejnar (2009) the size of the 
respective labour market is important for a number of reasons. Ibourk et al. (2004), for 
instance, use population density which is meant to capture effects coming from the 
density of economic activities and the probability that a contact is established between 
the right employer and employee, i.e., population density serves as a proxy for the size of 
social networks and the transmission of information. Munich and Svejnar (2009), on the 
other hand, indicate that not controlling for the district size may lead to biased 
coefficients unless the function exhibits constant returns to scale (omitted variable 
problem) which leads to the spurious scale effect. In our specification, we follow Ibourk 
et al. (2004) and use population density as covariate of technical efficiency. 
 
Results of these estimations are reported in Table 3.39 There are five different model 
specifications. First, only the ‘labour market structure’ variables (Figure A9 in Appendix 
2) are used. Then, ALMPs coverage rate variable is added to the model specification, 
while in the third specification the number of highly skilled CES employees per one 
unemployed (proxy of CES regional office capacity) is included. Specification four adds a 
measure of ‘demand fluctuation’, i.e., net income per capita, while specification five 
additionally includes time trend, measure of the region’s size (population density), and 
monthly and annual dummies.40  
                                                 
38 For instance, Mian and Sufi (2012) explain how negative demand shocks affected employment levels during the 
recent recession in the U.S. and use household balance sheets, i.e., debt-to-income ratio of the households, in this 
respect. They conclude that 65 percent of the lost jobs in the 2007-2009 time period is due to the decline in aggregate 
demand driven by household balance sheet shocks (Mian and Sufi, 2012). 
39 In this case, the efficiency estimates from the (restricted) specification with both stocks and flows of the unemployed 
(column 2 in Table 2) are used. 
40 Figure A11 in Appendix 3 shows correlations between the efficiency coefficient and a set of explanatory variables. 
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Table 3  Determinants of Technical Efficiency 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
0.0001 0.00003 -0.00004 -0.0006*** 0.0001 
v/u 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
-0.0197*** -0.0249*** -0.0166*** 0.0041* -0.0457*** 
reg_unrate 
(0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0038) 
-0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0006*** -0.0002 
m/delisted 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
-0.0009** -0.0011** -0.0011** -0.0014*** 0.0009* 
m_female 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
0.0331*** 0.0374*** 0.0301*** 0.0402 -0.0191*** 
u_female 
(0.0064)  (0.0076) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0068) 
-0.0027 -0.0024 0.0107*** 0.0134***  0.0349*** 
u_<24y 
(0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0029) 
0.0018 0.0008 -0.0051* -0.0011 0.0029 
u_12m+ 
(0.0027) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0029) 
-0.0313*** -0.0367*** -0.0397*** -0.032*** -0.0368*** 
u_w/o_experience 
(0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0028) 
0.0020** 0.0041*** 0.0057*** 0.0056** 0.0105*** 
u_primary_sector 
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
0.0009 0.0017 0.0027* 0.0013 0.0086*** 
u_benefits 
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
-0.0395*** -0.0412*** -0.0373*** -0.0371*** -0.0063** 
u_low skilled 
(0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0032) 
0.0121*** 0.0137*** 0.0113*** 0.0092*** 0.0019 
u_high skilled 
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) 
 0.0008** 0.0006** 0.0005* 0.0023*** 
u_almp coverage 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
  0.0316*** 0.0297*** 0.0301*** 
CES_high skilled 
  (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
   0.0638*** 0.0359*** 
net income_pc 
   (0.0037) (0.0079) 
    0.0012*** 
Time trend 
    (0.0001) 
    -2.79e-06*** 
Squared time trend 
    (4.73e-07) 
    0.0311*** 
pop_density 
    (0.0019) 
Monthly dummies     YES 
Annual dummies     YES 
0.5983*** 0.6038*** 0.8179*** 0.2256*** 0.2933*** 
Constant 
(0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0186) (0.0399) (0.07689) 
Wald 2χ  1098.45*** 1350.13*** 1598.98*** 2290.03*** 8095.08*** 
No. of observations 3168 3168 3168 3168 3168 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: estimates of the technical efficiency from the stochastic frontier as reported in Table 2 (column 
2). Monthly and annual dummies are statistically significant, detailed results available upon request. Hausman 
specification test suggests the use of fixed-effects estimator. However, after the models are checked for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, they are corrected by using cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression estimation. Standard errors reported 
in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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The capacity of the public employment services to match employers with the job-seekers 
may be negatively affected by some structural characteristics, but it is supposed to be 
positively affected by some policy variables, like number of PES employees (per number 
of the unemployed) or ALMPs coverage (Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz, 2009). The estimated 
coefficients in Table 3 only partially confirm these expectations. Namely, some of the 
covariates are not significant and for some that are significant, the sign of the 
relationship is not clear. However, as explained earlier, we are only trying to establish if 
there is a link between some control factors and the individual efficiency scores, not their 
causality.  
 
As far as structural variables are concerned, none of the estimated coefficients seems to be 
large enough to explain variations in the technical efficiency coefficient. Vacancy ratio as 
well as the share of the long-term unemployed proved to be insignificant in almost all of 
the model specifications41 while the share of those receiving unemployment benefits and 
share of the young is significant in some specifications while in others is insignificant. 
Besides that, depending on the model specification, some of the covariates change their 
sign, which suggests that the relationship between them and the matching efficiency is 
spurious. 
 
Taking all this into account, we can see that only regional unemployment rate,42 share of 
workers without experience, and share of low-skilled workers have unvarying negative and 
significant impact on technical efficiency, while the share of workers previously 
employed in the primary sector and share of high-skilled workers have significant and 
positive effect43 on the coefficient of technical efficiency. These results, except perhaps for 
the share of agricultural workers, are quite intuitive and expected.  
 
Unexpected results come (where significant) from the share of females in both the 
unemployed and the outflows from unemployment. Namely, larger percentage of females 
in the pool of the unemployed should signify less diversified labour markets, i.e., lower 
capacity for matching, while higher share of female outflows should signify exactly the 
opposite. However, in our case (in most of the specifications) a higher share of females in 
the unemployed positively affects efficiency estimates while female share in outflows 
from unemployment has a negative effect. Still, in the last model specification, where all 
the variables are included, these two covariates have an ‘appropriate’ sign. Another 
‘inconsistency’ comes with the young (<24) job-seekers where in the first two model 
specifications the sign for this covariate is negative (although insignificant), while later it 
becomes positive (as expected).  
 
Relationship between the share of persons receiving unemployment benefits and 
technical efficiency coefficient is another unexpected result. Namely, this variable 
                                                 
41 This is somehow surprising being that in some other empirical explorations (such as Fahr and Sunde, 2006) these 
variables proved to be important in explaining technical (in)efficiency of the matching process on a regional level. 
42 Except in the fourth model specification. 
43 Except in the last model specification for high-skilled workers. 
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positively affects matching efficiency (although is mostly insignificant). Being that it 
should affect the willingness to accept a job via increase in the reservation wage of the 
job-seeker, one would expect that the higher the share of unemployment benefit receivers, 
the lower the matching efficiency in a respective market. However, since the amount of 
the benefits on a monthly basis is on average pretty low (Rutkowski, 2003; Tomić and 
Domadenik, 2012) it does not have a great impact on the reservation wage increase, i.e., 
on lowering the matching efficiency. Positive effect probably comes from the fact that 
these people represent the recently unemployed (period of receiving benefits is also 
limited) with a higher search intensity.  
 
The ALMPs coverage rate has a positive and significant effect on the matching 
efficiency.44 This suggests that programmes are effectively targeted on the unemployed 
workers with below average matching efficiencies (Ibourk et al., 2004).45 However, the 
value of the estimated coefficient is too small to have any real impact on the matching 
efficiency. The number of highly skilled CES employees per one unemployed, on the 
other hand, is positive and somewhat larger, suggesting that the regional employment 
service office capacity positively affects matching efficiency.  
 
Since one should expect that units react differently to country-wide shocks, the response 
in the labour market may owe a lot to the local response to shock, apart from the 
efficiency of a local labour office. Thus, in the last two model specifications net income 
per capita in a respective county is added into the estimation. As expected, this coefficient 
is significant and positive indicating that ‘demand fluctuations’ have an impact on the 
matching efficiency as well. Time trend has a positive impact (visible in Figure 7 and 
Figure A10 in Appendix 3), as well as population density (last model specification). As 
Jeruzalski and Tyrowicz (2009) argue, a large part of the observed heterogeneity will be an 
interaction of time and unit characteristics.  
 
 
4.3 Stochastic Frontier Estimation by Model Transformation 
 
Table 4 contains estimation results from the transformed panel stochastic frontier model 
as suggested in Wang and Ho (2010). At this point, only the basic-form of the model is 
estimated - using merely the time trend and two variables indicating labour market 
structure46 as constraints for the technical efficiency as well as additional variable that 
should stand as a proxy for demand fluctuation (net income_pc).47  
 
                                                 
44 Via their effect on the composition of the stock of job-seekers. 
45 Additionally, this variable should also indicate the quality of the allocation of resources as well as staff quality of 
regional employment offices being that they are responsible for the selection of unemployed persons who participate in 
the programme. 
46 One that should affect efficiency positively (share of high-skilled workers) and one that should have a negative 
impact on efficiency (share of low-skilled workers). 
47 The model, by its construction, does not allow the inclusion of the constant as well as individual-specific and time-
invariant, i.e., dummy variables, into the equation. 
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As the results indicate, model transformation did not significantly change the 
estimations of the coefficients for the stock and flow of the unemployed (u and u_new) 
and flow of vacancies (v) in comparison with the ‘regular’ stochastic frontier estimation 
(Table 1 and Table 2). However, efficiency covariates are somewhat changed from the 
ones in earlier estimation (Table 3).  
 
Table 4  Stochastic Frontier Estimation by Model Transformation 
Total sample 
 
Stocks of u Flows of u Both Sum 
Frontier 
0.726***  0.918***  
u_tr 
(0.048)  (0.046)  
0.382*** 0.365*** 0.325*** 0.396*** 
v_tr 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 -0.278*** -0.370***  
u_new_tr 
 (0.019) (0.019)  
   0.583*** 
u_sum_tr 
   (0.050) 
Constraints 
0.368 0.521 0.262 0.545 
u_low skilled 
(0.398) (1.100) (0.254) (0.511) 
0.198 -0.077 -0.208 0.301 
u_high skilled 
(0.243) (0.626) (0.163) (0.322) 
-0.375 -1.360 0.911** -0.655 
net income_pc 
(0.588) (1.367) (0.447) (0.746) 
-0.018*** -0.033*** -0.018*** -0.020*** 
Time trend 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.006) 
-2.190*** -2.184*** -2.306*** -2.162*** 
υc  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
5.697 23.838 -20.507** 11.996 
uc  (12.150) (28.984) (8.690) (15.701) 
0.848 0.956 0.760 0.881 
Mean technical efficiency [ ](exp( ) | )itE u− Θ  
(0.122) (0.080) (0.132) (0.112) 
Wald 2χ  1217.11*** 1221.61*** 1729.66*** 1097.10*** 
Log likelihood  -1035.93 -1046.36 -857.84 -1079.16 
No. of observations 3146 3146 3146 3146 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: first difference of log of monthly flows to employment out of unemployment (d_m). iε~Δ=Θ ; 
)ln( 2υυ σ=c ; )ln( 2uuc σ= . Variables are in logarithms, lagged when necessary. Standard errors (except for technical 
efficiency where standard deviation is reported) reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Namely, variables representing labour market structure (share of low and high-skilled 
workers) are insignificant and of the sign opposite than the one expected in most of the 
model specifications. Variable representing demand fluctuations – regional net income 
per capita – is also insignificant, except in the model specification with both stock and 
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flow of the unemployed where it has an (expected) positive impact on the matching 
efficiency. 
 
Linear time trend is negative and significant in all the model specifications. This result 
indicates lowering efficiency over time, which was also the case in Jeruzalski and 
Tyrowicz’s (2009) first-difference estimation of the matching function. However, when 
looking at the estimated technical efficiency coefficients over the years one can observe 
the rise in the mean technical efficiency coefficient over time.  
 
As far as the estimates of the technical efficiency coefficient are concerned – a 
transformed model gives somewhat higher efficiency coefficients. As was already 
mentioned, mean technical efficiency coefficient is rising over time – similarly as in the 
case of the original model estimates (Figure 7) while variation across regions is somewhat 
different than in the original panel stochastic frontier estimation (Figure 6). However, 
this is only the basic-form model, while for stronger conclusions other variables 
(potentially) affecting the efficiency need to be included in the estimation. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This paper explores the efficiency in the labour market by estimating the matching 
function on a regional level in Croatia. Since there are huge regional differences in both 
employment and unemployment levels among Croatian regions (counties), the main 
objective of the paper is to evaluate the efficiency levels as well as changes that may have 
taken place both over time and across regions. Furthermore, the role of regional 
employment offices is taken into account. Thus, the empirical analysis is conducted on a 
regional level using the regional office-level data obtained from the Croatian 
Employment Service on a monthly basis in the period 2000-2011. In order to do that, 
panel stochastic frontier model is used, as well as its modified version – transformed 
panel stochastic frontier model.  
 
Main results point to a larger weight of job-seekers in the matching process in 
comparison to posted vacancies which is not unusual, especially taking into account the 
fact that vacancies posted at the CES offices are not all the available vacancies in the 
economy. Model specification that includes both stocks (at the end of the previous 
month) and flows (newly registered) of the unemployed, as well as the one that includes 
only stocks, points to the existence of constant returns to scale, while model specification 
with only flows of the unemployed suggests that the model exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale. In addition, flows of the unemployed included in the model, unlike in some other 
empirical analyses, increase positive impact of stocks.  
 
The main aim of the analysis – the efficiency of the matching process – proved to be 
rising over time with significant regional variations. On average, the technical efficiency 
of the matching process is 70-75 percent, ranging from about 50 percent in Sisak region 
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to almost 100 percent in Istria (Pula regional office). However, adding the newly 
registered unemployed to the model specification diminishes matching efficiency. The 
variations of estimated technical efficiency coefficients across regions suggest the need for 
the evaluation of the second stage analysis – i.e., the regression of technical efficiency 
coefficients and a set of covariates that should affect it. Namely, it is assumed that the 
policy relevant variables can be introduced into the original model if the assumption 
about the homogeneity of the unemployed is relaxed by varying the individual search 
intensities. Different search intensities emerge either due to the structural characteristics 
of the respective labour market (e.g., age, education) or due to policy variables like active 
labour market programmes or employment service staff capacity.  
 
As far as the labour market structure variables are concerned, the obtained results suggest 
that the regional unemployment rate and the shares of workers without experience and 
low-skilled workers in the pool of the unemployed have the highest negative impact on 
the matching efficiency while the shares of primary sector and high-skilled workers in the 
pool of total unemployed have the highest positive impact in the respective regional 
labour market. 
 
Policy variables, on the other hand, have a mostly positive impact on the matching 
efficiency. Nevertheless, the CES was reluctant to provide the data on financial resources 
devoted to each of its regional offices (or any financial data for that matter), as well as 
more detailed data about its staff, equipment and similar, which would be very helpful in 
determining the quality of services provided by the regional employment offices. Hence, 
the quality of the regional employment offices’ services is proxied by the number of 
highly skilled employed at the respective CES regional office per one unemployed as well 
as by the ALMP coverage rate which should indicate the quality of the allocation of 
resources as well as staff quality (they determine who participates in the programme) - 
both which have a positive impact on the efficiency of the matching process.  
 
Namely, the results suggest that the ALMP coverage rate has a positive impact on the 
efficiency of the matching process, but the size of the estimated coefficient is too small 
for us to come to any strong conclusions. However, the number of highly skilled CES 
employees per one unemployed indicates a stronger significant positive impact in all the 
model specifications. This suggests that the CES regional office staff caseload is 
important for the explanation of the variation in the matching efficiency. Yet, one has to 
bear in mind that the CES office staff capacity variable depends not only on the number 
of employees per one office, but even more on the number of unemployed persons in a 
respective region.  
 
Net income per capita, as an indicator of the demand fluctuations, also proved to have a 
positive impact on the matching efficiency. Thus, it seems that demand fluctuations 
remain one of the main causes of matching (in)efficiency in Croatia. It is nicely 
explained by Kuddo (2009: 65): “Active labour market services, in and of themselves, do 
not create jobs. In general, a favourable investment and business climate, and rapid 
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economic development are key to job creation. ALMPs can only contribute to less 
inequality in the labour market, a reduction in long-term unemployment, and an easier 
filling of the existing vacancies.” Nonetheless, it seems that the allocation of funds to 
regional employment offices is driven by the absorption capacity of the respective office, 
based on historical records while local needs serve only as a secondary factor. And this is 
something that should be definitely taken into account when implementing new policies 
and allocating funds to CES regional offices. However, due to data limitation, this could 
not be further explored in this paper.  
 
Then again, classic panel stochastic frontier estimation of the matching function has 
some problems, including possible endogeneity of independent variables. In order to get 
more consistent estimates, transformation of the original panel stochastic frontier model 
is applied. Nevertheless, preliminary results from the basic-form transformation model 
show that there is no significant difference in estimated mean technical efficiency 
coefficients in comparison to the original panel stochastic frontier model. Still, this 
result should be taken with caution since it included only a couple of variables possibly 
affecting matching efficiency. 
 
This paper should contribute to the literature in several ways. First of all, it adds to the 
existing literature that uses stochastic frontier estimation of the matching process in 
order to determine its efficiency. Secondly, by estimating matching efficiency on a 
regional level, this paper also assesses the role of (regional) employment offices in 
matching the registered unemployed job-seekers and posted vacancies. Methodological 
approach used here upgrades the standard estimation of the matching function by 
combining regional data on vacancies and the unemployed with additional data 
measuring the quality of services provided by regional employment offices. This could 
provide valuable policy information concerning further investments in (active) labour 
market policies. What's more, modified panel stochastic frontier model is applied for the 
first time to the labour market (matching process) by the estimation of the basic-form 
transformed panel stochastic frontier model. Namely, suggested modifications of the 
classic panel stochastic frontier model (Greene, 2005a; 2005b; Wang and Ho, 2010) were, 
up to this point, applied only to financial markets or health-care sector.  
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Appendix 1 – Data Description 
 
Table A1  Data Description 
Variable Description Type* Period Source Mean Std. Dev. 
M 
Number of employed persons from the 
CES Registry during the month 
Flow Monthly CES 538.838 498.130 
U 
Number of registered unemployed 
persons at the end of the previous (t-1) 
month  
Stock Monthly CES 14174.79 12536.88 
V Posted vacancies during the month Flow Monthly CES 514.403 595.357 
U_new 
Number of newly registered unemployed 
during the month 
Flow Monthly CES 954.800 899.247 
U_sum 
Sum of the no. of unemp. at the end of 
the previous month and the no. of newly 
registered unemp. during the month  
Stock + 
flow 
Monthly CES 15129.59 13338.36 
V/U 
Vacancy ratio (measure of labour market 
tightness) 
Flow over 
stock 
Monthly CES 0.039 0.030 
Reg_unrate 
Regional unemployment rate (per 
counties) on 31 March each year 
Stock Yearly CBS 0.244 0.088 
M/delisted 
Ratio of employed to delisted from the 
Registry for other reasons 
Flow Monthly CES 0.898 1.319 
M_female 
Share of females in total flows to 
employment 
Flow Monthly CES 0.528 0.085 
U_female Share of females in total unemployment Stock Monthly CES 0.566 0.047 
U_<24y 
Share of youth (≤24 years) in total 
unemployment 
Stock Monthly CES 0.215 0.056 
U_12m+ 
Share of long-term unemployed (12 
months or more) in total unemployment 
Stock Monthly CES 0.547 0.079 
U_w/o_experie
nce 
Share of persons without experience in 
total unemployment 
Stock Monthly CES 0.221 0.066 
U_primary_se
ctor 
Share of those previously employed in 
primary sector of economic activity in 
total unemployment 
Stock Monthly CES 0.039 0.026 
U_benefits 
Share of unemployed persons receiving 
unemployment benefits in total 
unemployment 
Stock Monthly CES 0.235 0.086 
U_low skilled 
Share of low-skilled (no schooling and 
uncompleted basic school + basic 
school) persons in total unemployment 
Stock Monthly CES 0.349 0.077 
U_high skilled 
Share of high-skilled (non-university 
college + university and postgraduate 
degrees) persons in total unemployment 
Stock Monthly CES 0.060 0.033 
U_almp 
coverage 
Share of persons in active labour market 
programmes in total number of 
unemployed in each regional office at 
the year end 
Stock Yearly CES 0.049 0.041 
CES_high 
skilled 
Number of highly skilled (non-university 
college + university and postgraduate 
degrees) employed at CES over the 
number of registered unemployed 
Stock 
Year over 
month 
CES 0.003 0.001 
Net 
income_pc 
Net income p/c in a specific county Stock Yearly MFIN/TA 18043.24 4986.01 
Pop_density Population density per km2  Stock Yearly CBS 81.663 59.082 
 
Notes: * - flow variable – during the month; stock variable – end of the previous (t-1) month or end of the year. 
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Table A2  Distribution of Regional Offices 
NUTS2 County (NUTS3) Regional office 
City of Zagreb 
Zagreb 
Zagreb ZG 
Krapina-Zagorje Krapina KR 
Varadin Varadin VZ 
Koprivnica-Krievci Krievci KZ 
Northwest Croatia 
Meðimurje Èakovec CK 
Bjelovar-Bilogora Bjelovar BJ 
Virovitica-Podravina Virovitica VT 
Poega-Slavonia Poega PZ 
Slavonski Brod-Posavina Slavonski Brod SB 
Osijek-Baranja Osijek OS 
Vukovar VU 
Vukovar-Srijem 
Vinkovci VK 
Karlovac Karlovac KA 
Sisak SK 
Central and Eastern (Pannonian) Croatia 
Sisak-Moslavina 
Kutina KT 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar Rijeka RI 
Lika-Senj Gospiæ GS 
Zadar Zadar ZD 
Šibenik-Knin Šibenik SI 
Split-Dalmatia Split ST 
Istria Pula PU 
Adriatic Croatia 
Dubrovnik-Neretva Dubrovnik DU 
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Appendix 2 – Additional Charts 
 
Figure A1  Regional Unemployment Rates 
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Note: Data relating to 31 March each year.  
Source: CBS. 
 
 
Figure A2  Newly Registered Unemployed to Newly Registered Vacancies (U-new/V) 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
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Figure A3  Number of Registered Unemployed Persons per One Job Counsellor by Regional 
Office (2009-2011) 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
 
Figure A4  Vacancy Ratio and Hiring Probabilities Across Regions – 2000m1 (left) and 
2011m12 (right) 
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Notes: M/U – hiring probability (outflow rate); V/U – vacancy ratio. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
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Figure A5  Mean Outflow Rate by Regional Office (2000m1-2011m12) 
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Note: Outflow rate – M/U. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
 
Figure A6  ALMP Coverage Rate Over the Years (2000-2011) 
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Note: ALMP coverage rate – the share of persons included in one of the active labour market programmes in total 
unemployment. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
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Figure A7  Mean Share of the New Entrants into Active Labour Market Programmes in Total 
Number of Unemployed Over Years (left) and Across Regional Offices (right) 
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Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
 
 
Figure A8  Mean Outflow Rate and Number of Highly Skilled CES Employees per Number of 
the Unemployed (left) and ALMP Coverage Rate (right) 
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Notes: M/U – hiring probability (outflow rate); ALMP coverage rate – the share of persons included in one of the active 
labour market programmes in total unemployment; CES_high skilled - number of highly skilled employed at respective 
CES office over the number of registered unemployed. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on CES data. 
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Figure A9  Unemployed Workers Main Characteristics (2000m1-2011m12) 
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Source: CES. 
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Appendix 3 – Technical Efficiency  
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